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Abstract 
 
 
This paper begins with a discussion of the role played by upgrading in the 
promotion of sustainable growth. Upgrading is discussed in two different 
contexts, that of industrial clusters and that of global value chains (GVCs). 
Drawing on global and African experiences, the paper addresses the 
upgrading agenda required to enable dynamic clusters to meet both domestic 
needs and progressively also needs in external markets. In the discussion of 
value chains, the paper distinguishes between vertically specialised and 
additive GVCs and shows how the upgrading agenda necessarily varies 
between these two families of GVCs. The paper concludes by briefly 
discussing two issues. The first is to distinguish between the upgrading 
agenda which is essential for sustaining economic growth and that which 
addresses the inclusivity (and thus sustainability) of the growth path. The 
second addresses the circumstances in which it may be possible to pursue 
these varied upgrading strategies simultaneously. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is unquestionable that rapid economic growth in many low and middle 
income economies has significantly reduced the numbers living in absolute 
poverty in the global economy. However, it is equally evident that despite this 
progress in aggregate global incomes, there remain very substantial pockets 
of absolute deprivation.1 Moreover, notwithstanding a pattern of successful 
income transfers in some Latin American economies over the past decade 
(Cornia, 2012), relative poverty in much of the global economy – that is, 
inequality within economies rather than between global citizens 2  – has 
increased sharply, not least in the industrialised north.  
 
These developments are increasingly reflected in global policy debates. It is 
now widely recognised that growth on its own is unlikely to meet the 
objectives embodied in the soon-to-expire Millennium Development Goals, or 
those likely to be included in the Sustainable Development Goals now under 
development. Thus the challenge of delivering inclusive growth is now high on 
the policy agenda. However, the inclusiveness of growth paths is important 
not just as a normative end in itself. If growth is not adequately inclusive, it 
may not be politically and socially sustainable. It is not surprising therefore 
that there is growing interest in the contribution which industrialisation might 
make to inclusive and sustainable growth.  
 
The pervasive liberalisation of trade and industrial policy forces global 
competition into the domestic arena in all economies. Withstanding the 
potentially immiserising effect of the intense competition, globalisation 
requires that economies develop the capacity to innovate.3 But it is not just 
the capacity to innovate which is required, but to innovate faster than rivals, 
that is to upgrade.  
 
In this paper we confine the discussion to two elements of the inclusive 
upgrading policy agenda. The first focuses on those aspects of policy which 
affect upgrading trajectories within industrial clusters. Here the focus begins 
with the domestic economy, since most of these clusters arise spontaneously 
to meet domestic demand. The second policy agenda turns to the patterns of 
upgrading which are relevant when production is geared to the external 
market, particularly when production occurs within the framework of global 
value chains (GVCs). 
 
                                             
1  There is considerable confusion on the numbers of people living below the MDG 
US1$ a day poverty line following the recalculation of the PPP rates which is currently 
being undertaken. For example, according to the 2005 PPP rates there were 456m 
people below $1 a day in India and 355m in SSA in 1990; using the new 2011 PPP 
rates, these numbers are estimated to be much lower, at 59 million and 157 million 
respectively. 
2  Considering global income distribution in terms of countries (that is not taking account 
of population) leads to an outcome of increasing global inequality. If countries are 
population-weighted (and particularly if China is considered), global inequality falls 
even though inequality within China has increased (Milanovic, 2005) 
3  By ‘immiserisation’ we refer to a situation in which the level of economic activity 
increases but is associated with falling real incomes. 
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A number of important observations frame this discussion. First, as observed 
above, globalisation represents a moving target of competition. Standing still 
will confine an economy to falling standards of living and hence the capacity 
to upgrade is critical for achieving sustainable growth, whatever its form. 
Second, many low- and middle-income economies (as well as some high- 
income economies such as Australia, Canada and Russia) have benefitted 
and are likely to continue to benefit from rising resource prices (Dobbs et. al., 
2011; Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2012),4 and this sets an important context for 
directing policy to achieve greater inclusion. Third, upgrading and the policies 
required to deliver this outcome, is necessarily contextual. It will vary by the 
degree and nature of capabilities in the economy, the size of the economy, its 
resource endowments and its location. It will also of course vary temporally, 
and at this point in time, economic growth in most economies is heavily 
influenced by the capacity of producers to insert themselves productively in 
GVCs. And, finally, and as a consequence of the structure of GVS, the 
capacity to upgrade is determined as much – and perhaps mostly – by shifts 
in positioning within sectors rather than in the capacity to diversify into new 
sectors. 
 
This background paper begins with a discussion of the role played by 
upgrading in the promotion of sustainable growth (Section 2). Section 3 turns 
to the upgrading challenge in industrial clusters. Drawing on global and 
African experience it addresses the upgrading agenda required to enable 
dynamic clusters to meet both domestic needs and progressively also needs 
in external markets. In Section 4 the paper turns to GVCs. It distinguishes two 
families of GVCs – vertically specialised and additive GVCs – and shows how 
the upgrading agenda necessarily varies between these two families of GVCs. 
The paper concludes by briefly discussing two issues. The first is to 
distinguish between the upgrading agenda which is essential for sustaining 
economic growth and that which addresses the inclusivity (and thus 
sustainability) of the growth path. The second addresses the circumstances in 
which it may be possible to pursue these varied upgrading strategies 
simultaneously. 
 
 
2. RENTS, INNOVATION AND UPGRADING 
 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith postulated that the most important 
contributor to long-run income growth is the increase in productivity, that is, 
intensive rather than extensive growth. Smith went on to argue that 
specialisation and the division of labour provided the key to productivity 
growth. In turn, “…it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the 
division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the 
extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market” (Smith 
1776: 31). 
 
                                             
4  The argument that resource prices are likely to remain robust over the medium- to 
long-term does not mean that individual commodities such as iron ore and coal will 
not suffer from excess supply. 
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In Smith’s day – and in the case of the small scale and informal sector in 
many contemporary low and middle income economies - an increase in scale 
meant trading with neighbouring districts or cities. But now, with sustained 
and massive advances in communication and information processing 
technologies, the market is increasingly global. Globalisation provides the 
scope to gain from scale economies and in so doing, to reap the benefits of 
specialisation. But larger markets offer a further benefit. Selling into 
demanding and competitive markets exposes producers to new ways of 
processing, new capital goods, new customers and new product designs. 
Given the rapidity of technical progress in highly competitive global markets, 
the capacity to learn through exporting offers rewarding prospects for 
economic management and for individual producers. 
 
There are a number of economies and many firms which have managed to 
grasp the opportunities provided by rapid export growth to achieve sustained 
income growth. The most prominent examples of economies are those in Asia 
– initially Japan from the 1950s and 1960s, then the Asian Tigers (Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) from the 1970s and 1980s, and most 
recently China after the mid-1980s. This wide-ranging economy-wide success 
was built on the performance of successful exporting firms such as Toyota 
(Japan), Samsung (Korea), Acer (Taiwan) and Huawei (China). 
 
However, the potential for reaping these different benefits made possible 
through participating in global markets does not automatically translate into 
the reality of achieving these gains. Consider the experience of the Central 
American economies in the 1980s and 1990s who sought to promote export 
and income growth through an expansion of Export Processing Zones 
(Kaplinsky, 1993). Many firms burnt their fingers in this phase of export 
expansion. For example, a Dominican Republic assembler of jeans for the US 
market invested $150,000 in new equipment in 1989. It began exporting 9,000 
jeans a week at a unit price of $2.18, but in the space of 12 months the 
quantity and price of these exports fell progressively to 5,000 and $2.00 and 
then to 3,000 and $1.87 respectively. Fourteen months after beginning 
production, the firm’s primary buyer cancelled the contract and the firm was 
bankrupted. These firm-level developments resulted from macroeconomic 
policies in the Dominican Republic and in neighbouring countries. They 
engaged in a progressive round of IMF-World Bank supported competitive 
devaluations. As surrounding economies devalued their currencies at a 
greater rate  the $ value of Dominican Republic wages rose above those paid 
in other regional economies, leading to the bankruptcy of the jeans exporter. 
Thus, this mode of export growth did not provide for sustainable income 
growth. Rather, it led either to a fall in the size of the economy as firms and 
countries were excluded form global markets or for immiserising growth, that 
is, a process of increasing economic activity with declining real incomes. 
 
What makes the difference between these positive and negative outcomes? 
The answer lies in the capacity to exploit and generate rents, to appropriate 
rents and to protect rents. Rent describes an environment of scarcity in the 
context of demand. The holder of rent benefits from an absence (relative or 
absolute) of competition, protected by one or more barriers to entry. The more 
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desired the scarce attribute, and the higher the barriers to entry, the higher 
are the resultant incomes. If these barriers to entry can be protected, then the 
resultant incomes are sustainable over time. Where they cannot be protected, 
the ability to generate new rents (‘dynamic rents’) provides for sustained 
growth of production and income. Hence the capacity to benefit from rents on 
a systematic and dynamic basis provides the key to a gainful insertion into 
global export markets and for high and growing incomes. Conversely, the 
inability to generate and appropriate rents subjects the producer to 
intensifying competition, and hence the prospect of low, and in some cases, 
falling incomes. 
 
Three primary sources of rent affect income streams.5 The first are resource 
rents. These are “gifts of nature” whereby a producer has access to relatively 
better land or resource deposits than a rival, and where the price of the 
resource is set by the costs of production of the less well-endowed producer. 
Examples of such resource rents can be found across the resource sector – 
particularly fertile agricultural land, high ore-content minerals close to the 
surface, and low-cost and accessible hydrocarbon deposits.  
 
The second major category of rents are those which are created by 
producers, increasingly through the systematic application of knowledge to 
production. Typically these are referred to as “Schumpeterian” (or 
“innovation”) rents. These rents may be generated by developing better 
production processes than rivals, introducing higher quality or differentiated 
products or developing forms of organisation which are superior to those 
utilised by rivals whose costs structures determine final prices. It is helpful to 
think of these rents as “endogenous rents”, that is they are endogenous to the 
participants involved in the chain of production. In GVC analysis the ability of 
firms in various links of the chain to create such endogenous rents is 
understood through the concepts of process, product, and functional 
upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). 
 
Complementing these endogenous “created” rents are the exogenous rents 
which are external to the production chain participants, but which influence 
their capacity to generate rents. Thus compared to rivals in other economies, 
producers may benefit, for example, from access to better forms of 
infrastructure, from lower cost and directed financial intermediation, have 
access to a better trained workforce and to other inputs which affect their 
capacity to produce effectively. 
 
Whilst these three categories of rent – resource, endogenous and exogenous 
– are distinct, they are not independent. For example, the capacity of the 
productive sector to generate and appropriate rents will be a function of the 
environment in which they operate and the exogenous rents which it provides. 
Moreover, chain participants are able to influence the policy environment and 
help to shape the structure of exogenous rents. Similarly, although resource 
rents are a gift of nature, innovation by chain participants in the search for 
                                             
5  Since the focus of this discussion is on investment and upgrading, we will not 
consider a fourth component of rent, that is, the exercise of monopoly power to 
exclude competitors. 
 6
endogenous rents may lower the costs of resource extraction or produce 
technologies which compensate for low-grade resource deposits (Wright and 
Czelusta, 2004). 
 
In summary, the inclusive growth and industrialisation challenge lies in the 
capacity to exploit resource rents, to generate rents through innovations, to 
protect rents by constructing or taking advantage of barriers to entry and then, 
finally, to appropriate rents. The capacity to upgrade opens the door to 
reaping these diverse rents. For many small scale and informal sector 
enterprises, this rent agenda is acted out in the domestic economy; for larger 
scale firms, the rent agenda requires engaging with foreign competitors.  
 
We begin with a discussion of upgrading in clusters in Section 3. The reason 
for focusing on clusters are twofold. First, most (but not all) clusters in low and 
middle income markets use labour intensive and small scale technologies and 
meet the needs of domestic and low income consumers. These clusters are 
thus not only the source of growth, but also of inclusion, particularly since 
there are few signs that the large scale formal sector enterprises will be able 
to meet the challenge of creating jobs in economies with very high rates of 
unemployment. Second, most of these economies suffer from a “missing 
middle” between small and micro sized enterprises (SMEs) and the large 
scale formal sector. Dynamic clusters thus provide a stepping stone in the 
growth trajectory of these economies. But if this dynamism is merely a form of 
extensive growth – the replication of what exists – it is unlikely that they will 
deliver sustained and sustainable growth. Hence the capacity to upgrade is a 
core challenge confronting clusters globally, including in low and middle 
income economies. 
 
In Section 4 we turn to upgrading in GVCs. As we will see, an increasing 
proportion of global trade now occurs within the framework of GVCs. But 
unless producers can insert themselves gainfully into these GVCs they face 
the prospect of engaging in a race to the bottom. Gainful insertion in GVCs 
requires the capacity to upgrade. 
 
 
3. UPGRADING IN INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
 
 
The fastest growing district of Italy during the 1970s was the Emilia Romagna 
region, which had the country’s highest per capita income. In 1980 the 
average firm size in the Emilia Romagna region was five employees. Ninety 
per cent of these firms employed less than 99 workers. During this period, the 
region experienced very rapid industrialisation – between 1951 and 1971, the 
share of the population employed in industry rose from 25% to 51%. In 1983 
Emilia-Romagna accounted for 10% of Italy’s exports, and had a trade surplus 
of $5bn.6  
 
                                             
6  All data in this paragraph are drawn from Best, 1990: 204-205 
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One of the striking features of this export success in Italy is that economic 
sectors were often spontaneously clustered in particular towns. Woollen 
textile firms concentrated in Prato, ham producers in Parma, ceramics in 
Sassuolo and ladies footwear in Brenta. Hence, the phrases “clusters” and 
“industrial districts” were largely synonymous in the Italian context and this 
ambiguity in nomenclature continues to exist. As a general rule in most 
countries clusters are generally concentrated sectorally in particular districts. 
Initially the cluster may begin with the manufacture of the final product, but as 
it develops, it draws in related suppliers, user firms, business services 
providers and buyers.  (Although in some cases, clusters include firms drawn 
from a variety of unrelated sectors, for example  when the cluster is located in 
an industrial park, in what follows we refer to clusters as comprising firms from 
a particular sector and its related industries). 
 
But these industrial districts are not confined to Italy. In the film industry, 
production is clustered in Hollywood, Bollywood and Nollywood. High-tech 
firms are clustered in Silicon Valley. In Seattle, specialist software firms 
operate in the vicinity of Microsoft and firms specialising in new materials are 
clustered around the Boeing plant. Similar clusters have developed in the 
electronic games industry in the UK, with regional clusters of capabilities as 
well as firms in Guildford, Leeds, Brighton and Dundee. In Germany, 
metalworking and machine tools are clustered in mid-sized “Mittelstand” firms 
in Bad Wurtenburg and, in France high-tech enterprises are clustered around 
Sophia Antipolis.  
 
The  emergence of these clusters is explained by the presence of external 
economies. As Alfred Marshall who pioneered our understanding of industrial 
districts (a synonym for clusters) observed, these external economies were 
driven by market forces and were an “unintended or incidental by-product of 
some otherwise legitimate activity” (Marshall, 1919: 221). External economies 
in cluster development reflect a  variety of spillovers. One clear advantage of 
clustering is the existence of a pool of skilled labour. For example, the 
electronic games clusters in UK cities are characterised by a large turnover of 
firms, with high mortality rates. But as some firms die, new ones emerge, 
drawing on the pool of mobile labour in the environs. Another form of external 
economy is the existence of a pool of specialised suppliers. This can be 
widely observed in the auto sector, with component firms clustering around 
assembly plants such as Toyota City in Japan and (formerly) Michigan in the 
US. Third, this supply base is often located near a set of advanced Research 
and Technology Organisations in what is called a ‘National’, ‘Regional’ or 
‘Sectoral’ system of innovation. A fourth important source of external economy 
is that clusters draw buyers to an area, in the knowledge that one amongst 
the many co-located firms (or indeed shops, in the retail sector) will be able to 
meet their needs. Finally, where production systems require rapid response 
(for example, when market demand is customised or is volatile), or involve the 
transport of bulky materials, the co-location of suppliers and assemblers can 
reduce inventories and transport costs.  
 
However, notwithstanding the demonstrated contribution of market forces to 
spontaneous cluster development, detailed examination of the performance of 
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clusters in an increasingly competitive global economy after the 1970s 
showed the limits of external economies. It became evident that successful 
and dynamic clusters could not be sustained if they relied on unintended and 
accidental external economies alone. For example, how could the small Italian 
clothing, footwear and furniture firms which dominated global sales meet the 
needs of buyers purchasing in large volumes? The answer was that these 
firms operated in consorzia, sharing brandnames and showrooms, often 
agreeing to common designs and dividing large volume orders amongst a 
large number of small scale suppliers  (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990). 
Other forms of cooperation included access to finance. In Modena, Italy, 
during the 1970s, 3,500 firms participated in a Loan Consortium, providing 
financial guarantees to members obtaining loans from banks. This not only 
provided access to finance, but because of low default rates, meant that the 
costs of loans was 1.5-2% lower than for non-members (Best, 1990: 215). 
 
Thus it became evident that dynamic and sustainable clusters were 
characterised by what has come to be called “collective efficiency” (Schmitz, 
1995a). This involved two phenomena. The first was the external economies 
which arose as unintended and unplanned consequences of simple 
agglomeration. As we saw this comprised benefits such as a reservoir of 
skills, local suppliers and a “magnet” for customers seeking alternative 
suppliers. The second component of collective efficiency is when firms in the 
cluster engage in purposeful, planned joint action.  
 
The experience of clusters in the high income economies suggests that 
successful collective efficiency depends on the degree of trust amongst 
members. Two elements of trust can be identified from these examples 
(Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Saraph, 1998). The first is competence trust, the 
knowledge that members of the cluster have the capabilities to not only meet 
existing technological and organisational challenges, but in a dynamic and 
fluid world economy, to also respond to new and often unanticipated 
technological and organisational challenges. The second form of trust is 
contractual trust – can the members’ word be depended on, will they adhere 
to their commitments? 
 
But important as inter-firm cooperation and trust might be, they are generally 
not enough to ensure a cluster’s survival in a turbulent world. Clusters often 
also require support from government, whether this be local, regional or 
national government. In Italy, where government was highly decentralised, 
during the heyday of its industrial clusters the Emilia Romagna region was 
dominated by municipal governments. As the clusters increasingly 
participated in global markets and as technology became increasingly 
challenging (including as a result of the diffusion of computers), local 
governments helped sectorally specialised service centres provide training 
and technological support. In the UK’s new media and computer games 
sector, local government in Sussex supported the development of a large, and 
now almost entirely privately-funded support centre, assisting more than 
2,000 members with business development, training, accommodation, labour 
mobility, marketing and other services (www.wiredsussex.com). 
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Cluster Development in Growing Global Markets 
 
The industrial clusters developed around Birmingham during Britain’s 
industrial revolution (recognised by both Marshall and Marx) served a local 
market. This was true of most clusters until the advance of globalisation. After 
the 1960s trade policy reform swept through much of the world economy and 
the consequent liberalisation challenged clusters in a number of ways. First, 
as the market widened, they had to learn to meet the demands of alien and 
distant consumers with whom they were not familiar. Second, they had to 
produce in much larger volumes, since typically the global buyers who were 
driving globalisation sought to sell into a variety of markets at the same time. 
A third challenge increasingly confronting the vibrant clusters of the 1960s 
and 1970s was the rapid advance of new technologies. This required a shift 
from artisanal production to semi-automated and automated production. It 
also vastly increased the knowledge content in production, requiring member 
firms to become increasingly specialised and to invest in skills, R&D and 
design. These challenges posed major problems for clusters across sectors, 
and many of the clusters which had dominated global trade in sectors such as 
footwear, ceramics, clothing and furniture failed to make the required 
transitions. The Italian industrial districts which had been the exemplar for 
industrial districts during the 1980s and 1990s saw a sharp rate of decline 
(Rabellotti et al., 2009).  
 
The fourth challenge was even more daunting for cluster development. As we 
will see below, the expansion of the global economy in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century was largely driven by global value chains. Successful 
participation in these chains is very demanding and producers have to dance 
to the tunes of global buyers of final and intermediate products and services. 
Unless producers can meet these needs, they are excluded from these global 
value chains. Trust – competence and contract – is just as critical in these 
vertical global chains as it is in the horizontal industrial clusters. But so, too, is 
the capacity of individual producers in the chain to wrestle not only with 
improvements in process and product, but also in their positioning in these 
global value chains. The upshot of this transition from “horizontal” (i.e. 
industrial district) to “vertical” (i.e. GVC) allegiances has often placed 
insuperable pressures on clusters and cluster members, radically altering the 
policy attraction of promoting industrial clusters in an era of global production 
and forcing a deep structural reorganisation of their form and structure.  
 
Industrial Clusters in Low and Middle-Income Economies 
 
So much for the dynamic clusters in high income economies. But what of 
clusters in low and middle income economies? It is widely argued that clusters 
in low and middle income economies are distinctive from those clusters in the 
high income economies (Schmitz and Nadvi 2000). These differences take 
the following forms. 
 
First, many clusters, particularly those in the least developed economies or in 
localities of great poverty in middle income economies, are essentially 
survivalist in nature. Unlike the dynamic clusters of Emilia Romagna, the 
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participants in these clusters have few alternative sources of employment. 
Hence they engage in petty manufacturing or services, often on an occasional 
or “casual basis”. These clusters remain essentially static for many years, 
showing little signs of upgrading or firm development. The second 
distinguishing feature of the low income clusters is the market which is 
served. This is overwhelmingly local in nature. The entrepreneurs essentially 
make the sorts of products which they themselves consume and there is little 
incentive for product upgrading or for the extended division of labour which, 
as Adam Smith observed, is a function of the size of the market. Third, and 
this is a strength of a limited number of these low income clusters, they do 
have the advantage of providing “riskable”, small steps for improvement. In 
theory this provides the capacity for SMEs in these economies to fill the 
“missing middle” between the myriad of small firms and the large, often 
foreign-owned enterprises which dominate the industrial sector (Schmitz, 
1995a). This then raises the possibility of shifting policy from support for 
SMEs (a widely used policy lever in many economies) to support for industrial 
clusters in which SMEs participate. 
 
China’s experience with industrial clusters is distinctive in terms of their 
history, their size, their external orientation and the role played by 
government. Whilst China has a long history of cluster development (Enright 
et al., 2005) the recent dynamism of their clusters has been driven by 
proactive government policies. This policy agenda began in the immediate 
post-revolutionary period in which Mao Zedong actively promoted clusters as 
a strategic defence against the possibility of hostile external forces. Building 
on this experience (although following a very different approach to FDI, 
technology transfer and market orientation), a series of Special Economic 
Zones  (SEZs) were established, providing tax and other incentives and 
designed to promote exports through inward FDI and (increasingly) joint 
ventures between Chinese and foreign owned firms. The first five 
experimental SEZs were established between 1980 and 1984, a further 14 
were created in 1984 and the number has expanded rapidly since then. 
Support for clustering in general, and SEZs in particular, has not been limited 
to the central government. Provincial government was also an active 
participant in cluster development as was city and township government. 
China’s Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were the backbone of its 
industrial development until the end of the twentieth century. 
 
Initially these clusters concentrated in labour intensive sectors, and although 
of diminishing relative importance in the economy, they continue to make a 
major contribution to output, exports and employment. By 2006, in 15 labour 
intensive industries, there were an estimated 536 clusters, with an average of 
923 enterprises, $620m of sales and 51,883 employees per cluster (Wang 
and Mei, 2009). Most of these industrial clusters were located in formally 
constituted SEZs. In total, these SEZs – labour intensive and high-tech - were 
estimated to account for 22% of China’s GDP and 60% of exports and to have 
resulted in 30m jobs in 2007. More recently, the SEZs have concentrated on 
high tech sectors and between 1995 and 2010, these high tech clusters 
accounted for half of the value of high tech industrial output and one-third of 
China’s high-tech exports (Zhihua, 2014).  
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African Experience with Clusters7 
 
With more than 50 countries, each with its own history and trajectory, with 
different ecologies and endowments of natural resources, there is inevitably a 
range of cluster experience on the African continent. Moreover, unlike the 
widely documented European and Chinese clusters, the characteristics of 
most African clusters are poorly recorded. Although it is thus difficult to 
generalise with any confidence across such a diverse landscape, a review of 
what is known about African clusters does point to a few general trends.  
 
An extensive search of the English-language academic literature documents, 
with varying degrees of detail and with different focal points, yielded 
information on the experience of 25 African clusters (Table 1). These span 9 
economies – Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Mauritius, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Uganda. They include clusters in the south, east, west and 
north of the continent, and both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
The African cluster experience is considered in relation to the major 
determinants of cluster dynamics in other regions of the global economy, and 
with a focus on their capacity to upgrade. 
 
The first consideration is the market for the cluster’s output, since the nature 
of the final market is a primary determinant in the organisation of competitive 
supply. The second issue considered is the dynamism of the cluster with 
respect to its growth and upgrading trajectories. Not all clusters are dynamic, 
and the evidence suggests that static clusters either are survivalist in nature 
or ‘die’. The third is the nature of the external economies which explain why 
most clusters exist. These are the spillovers between co-located enterprises 
which are unplanned, in particular with regard to labour and skills, the 
proximity of suppliers and customers and the extent of specialisation between 
firms. Beyond unintended external economies lies the possibility of joint action 
between enterprises, distinguishing in our analysis logistics, marketing and 
training. Finally, the institutionalisation of support to each of the clusters is 
assessed. This support may be provided by government, by formal 
associations developed by the private sector and by parties external to the 
economy, such as lead firms or aid agencies. 
 
All of these observations are judgements made on the basis of publically 
available material on the nature and the performance of these 25 clusters. It is 
not possible to subject these clusters to any form of numerical analysis since 
each of these clusters has been documented in a different form.  
 
                                             
7  This discussion of African clusters is drawn from Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014a 
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Table 1: Africa’s Experience with 25 Clusters  
Cluster End Market Evidence of Dynamism External Economies 
Collective 
Action 
Forms of Institutional 
Support 
E
g
y
p
t
 
Dormiatt Furniture 
(Domestic) 
Local, National None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
None Cluster/sectoral 
Dormiatt Furniture 
(Export) 
International Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Marketing, 
Learning, 
Logistics 
External 
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
 
Merkato Leather 
Footwear 
Local, National None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Logistics Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
Shiro Meda 
Handloom  
Local, National None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction 
None External 
G
h
a
n
a
 
 
Suame Metalwork Local Upgrading Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction 
None Government 
Suame Vehicle 
Repair 
Local,  
Regional  
None Availability of suppliers, customer attraction, 
specialised service providers 
Learning  Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
K
e
n
y
a
 
Gikomba 
Furniture 
Local None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, 
specialised service providers 
None None 
Ngong Furniture Local Growth Labour supply, availability of suppliers None None 
Kibuye Furniture Local None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, 
specialised service providers 
Logistics Cluster/sectoral 
Eastland Garment Local None Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
None None 
Kamukunji 
Metalwork 
Local  None Availability of suppliers, customer attraction Marketing, 
Learning  
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral  
Ziwani Vehicle  Local  Upgrading Availability of suppliers, customer attraction Learning Cluster/sectoral, External  
Lake Victoria Nile 
Perch 
Local, National, 
International 
Growth, 
Upgrading 
Availability of suppliers, customer attraction, 
specialised service providers 
Logistics, 
Learning 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
Lake Naivasha 
Cut Flower 
International Growth, 
Upgrading  
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Marketing, 
Learning, 
Logistics 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
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N
i
g
e
r
i
a
 
Otigba Computer 
Hardware 
National, 
Regional, 
International 
Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Marketing, 
Learning, 
Logistics 
Cluster/sectoral 
Nnewi Auto Parts National, 
Regional 
Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Logistics Cluster/sectoral, External 
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
 Textile & Clothing International Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Marketing, 
Learning, 
Logistics 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
Cape Clothing & 
Textile 
National Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Logistics, 
Learning 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
KZN Clothing & 
Textile 
National Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Logistics, 
Learning 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
Durban 
Automotive 
National, 
International 
Growth, 
Upgrading 
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Marketing, 
Learning, 
Logistics 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
South African 
Wine 
Local, National, 
International 
Growth, 
Upgrading  
Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction 
Marketing, 
Learning 
Government, External 
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
 
Mwenge 
Handcrafts 
Local, National, 
Regional 
Growth customer attraction, specialised service 
providers 
Learning, 
Marketing 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral 
Gerezani 
Metalworks 
Local, National None customer attraction, specialised service 
providers 
Learning, 
Marketing 
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral 
Keko Furniture Local, Regional Growth Labour supply, availability of suppliers, customer 
attraction, specialised service providers 
Learning, 
Marketing 
Cluster/sectoral 
U
g
a
n
d
a
 Fish Processing 
 
Local, National, 
International 
Growth, 
Upgrading 
Availability of suppliers, customer attraction, 
specialised service providers 
Logistics, 
Learning  
Government, 
Cluster/sectoral, External 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris 2014a 
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Moving beyond this summary of 25 clusters (Table 2), we now consider each 
of these cluster characteristics in more detail. The first issue is whether there 
is any correspondence between the location of the final market and the 
dynamism of the clusters (Table 2). A clear pattern emerges here. The three 
clusters selling primarily into global markets, the six clusters selling into 
national markets and the 10 clusters selling into domestic and regional 
markets show signs of both sustained growth and upgrading. By contrast, the 
seven clusters selling into the immediate vicinity show the least signs of 
growth and upgrading – they are predominantly survivalist clusters. It is not 
possible to determine the direction of causality in these numbers, that is 
whether only dynamic clusters are able to sell outside local markets, or 
whether the act of selling outside local markets leads to enhanced growth and 
upgrading. 
 
Table 2: The final market and cluster dynamism 
 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014a 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, all of the 25 clusters benefit from at least one of 
the four categories of external economies – labour skills spillovers, proximity 
of suppliers, proximity of customers and the development of inter-firm 
specialisation and the division of labour. Table 3 considers the prevalence of 
individual external economies in these 25 clusters. It shows that 12 of the 
clusters benefit from all four types of spillover, eight benefit from three types, 
and five benefit from two types of externalities. In none of the clusters did 
firms benefit from only one type of external economy. 
 
Table 3: Prevalence of external economies 
 
Evidence of External Economies Number of Clusters 
Availability of Labour Supply 18 
Availability of Suppliers 23 
Customer Attraction 22 
Inter-firm specialization 19 
2 External Economies 5 
3 External Economies 8 
All 4 External Economies 12 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014a 
 
 Evidence of Dynamism Number of 
Clusters Market Orientation Growth Upgrading Growth & Upgrading 
Local only 1 2 0 7 
Domestic (Local and National) 2 2 2 6 
Domestic and Regional  1 0 1 4 
Domestic and International 5 5 5 5 
International only 3 3 3 3 
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International experience shows that clusters achieve collective efficiency 
when members build on these accidental external economies and take 
deliberate joint action to strengthen cluster performance. Table 4 considers 
three types of joint action – skill development, marketing and logistics – and 
the extent to which this is associated with cluster dynamism. Approximately 
75% of the 16 clusters cooperating in skill development have experienced 
sustained growth or upgrading, or both. A smaller number of clusters 
cooperated in either marketing (10 of 25 clusters) or logistics (11 of 25 
clusters). Logistics cooperation is particularly closely associated with growth 
and upgrading, whereas joint marketing does not appear to be as important. 
The more clusters engaged in different types of joint action simultaneously, 
the more likely this was associated with cluster dynamism. Once again, 
causality cannot be imputed from these aggregate data alone. 
 
Table 4: Cluster dynamism and join action 
 
 Evidence of Dynamism Number of 
Clusters Evidence of Collective Activity Growth Upgrading Growth & Upgrading 
Learning 12 11 10 16 
Marketing 8 6 6 10 
Logistics  10 10 10 11 
1 Collective Activity 0 3 2 5 
2 Collective Activities 7 5 5 9 
All 3 Collective Activities  5 5 5 5 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014a 
 
Finally, there are a variety of forms of institutionalisation of joint action 
activities. One source of support is through government, either national or 
local government or both. Another form of institutionalisation is that created by 
the members of the cluster itself, or by sectoral associations. These 
institutions are both private sector driven. The third form of support is provided 
by parties external to the economy, such as through aid or NGOs. Table 5 
shows the distribution of these institutional support programmes in the 25 
clusters. The largest number of clusters received multiple types of support – 
from government, through the firm’s own contributions and from external 
sources. Four of the clusters support institutions were entirely the result of 
private sector cluster and sectoral initiatives, and an additional three involved 
collaborations between governments and the private sector. 
 
Table 5: Institutional support for joint action 
 
 Number of 
Clusters Evidence of Institutional Support 
Only Government 1 
Only Cluster/sectoral 4 
Only External 2 
Government & Cluster/sectoral 3 
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Government & External 1 
Cluster/sectoral & External 2 
Government, Cluster/sectoral, External 9 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014a 
 
The Upgrading Agenda in Industrial Clusters 
 
The review of global and African experience show that clusters are widely 
observed as a natural outcome of economic activity, and with the exception of 
some of the Chinese Special Economic Zones, they have arisen 
spontaneously as a consequence of the external economies associated with 
geographical clustering. Although many – perhaps most – clusters in low and 
in many middle income economies are predominantly static and survivalist in 
nature, there is experience in many low and middle income economies of 
successful and dynamic cluster development. The dynamic clusters are 
associated with an extension of their sales from the immediate locality to 
national, regional and foreign markets. They are also characterised by a 
range of external economies, particularly with regard to skills, the clustering of 
suppliers which provides for specialisation amongst firms, being a magnet for 
buyers, developing trust to support collective action and by the capacity to 
upgrade their operations. Numerous types of institutional support also 
accompany dynamic cluster development. A major obstacle to cluster 
development in many low and middle income economies is poor 
infrastructure, particularly transport, water, power and secure accommodation. 
 
A key characteristic of most of these clusters is that they involve small scale 
producers and that they often originate in the informal sector where many of 
them continue to operate. Most of these clusters also produce low priced 
“poor quality” consumption goods for the poor. Hence the consolidation and 
expansion of these clusters fits well with the inclusive industrialisation and 
inclusive growth agendas. However, as these clusters grow, as competing 
domestic clusters expand and as trade liberalisation deepens, it is essential 
that these clusters upgrade on a continuous basis. What does this imply for 
an upgrading agenda? 
 
As we observed above, two types of clusters can be identified. The first are 
those which have emerged “naturally”; the second are those (such as the new 
Chinese Special Economic Zones) have been established ab initio as a result 
of policy interventions. Although the upgrading agenda is common to both 
types of clusters, their upgrading trajectories and the drivers of upgrading will 
likely vary. 
 
The cluster upgrading agenda involves four main arenas for action – in final 
markets, in process technology, in organisational technology, and in the inter-
firm division of labour which includes positioning in the value chain. 
 
The role of markets in cluster upgrading 
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Consumers play an important role in upgrading in a number of respects. First, 
more demanding consumers require producers to focus on the design and 
quality of their output, and on the process and organisational technologies 
which they use to deliver these product characteristics. But whilst it is often 
the case that these new markets are more demanding, there may also be 
cases where clusters target a less demanding set of consumers. This too will 
require a change in product portfolio and in the derived production processes. 
Thus, being confronted by new demands from consumers and by the offerings 
of competitors is often the prime driver for cluster upgrading and this applies 
whether the extended market is in the domestic economy or abroad.  
 
There is an additional respect in which markets affect the upgrading agenda. 
In northern economies there is a well-documented process of user-driven 
innovation where predominantly sophisticated consumers interact with 
producers in the design and development of new products (von Hippel, 2005). 
Although largely undocumented in low and middle income economies, similar 
user-producer interactions also occur, as in the case of mobile phone 
applications in Kenya (Foster and Heeks, 2013). Entirely undocumented are 
cases where users interact with producers in informal sector clusters, but 
there are no reasons to believe that such synergies do not exist and that they 
have no role to play in cluster upgrading. This will probably begin with user-
producer interactions which lead to the upgrading of products, but in many 
cases this will probably also involve the upgrading of processes. 
 
Upgrading production processes 
 
Most clusters in low and middle income economies – be they survivalist or 
dynamic – tend to use small scale and basic technologies, much of which may 
be second hand. Often this is because their small final markets do not allow 
for the purchase of large and scale-intensive technologies, but it also may be 
a reflection of the high acquisition costs of more sophisticated equipment. The 
upgrading challenges in these clusters, particularly in informal sector clusters, 
are complex. In some cases the solution to process upgrading lies in the 
purchase of new and better equipment. In other cases, the challenge might be 
to improve the equipment which is already being used in the cluster. A further 
solution might be to search for new sources of capital goods which represent 
an improvement in what they use, but may be of “lower quality” than 
equipment purchased from more established capital goods suppliers. Here 
there are particular prospects for south-south transfers of technology. 
 
A good example of these upgrading challenges can be observed in Kenya’s 
furniture industry (Attah-Ankomah, 2014). In recent years, many of the 
clustered furniture manufacturers have switched from using northern based 
machinery to much cheaper equipment from China. These Chinese machines 
are generally less robust and produce to a lower quality than the northern-
origin machines. But they have much lower barriers to entry, are more labour 
intensive and generally have lower costs of production. Kenyan machinery 
manufacturers – also operating in the informal sector – have responded to this 
market opportunity and either produce their own cheaper versions of furniture 
manufacturing equipment, but with even lower quality output, or help to 
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“blend” a combination of Chinese and northern machines, utilising northern 
motors.8 The overall impact is an improvement in both productivity and in 
product quality and at least one of the furniture clusters is venturing into much 
higher quality final markets using a mix of Chinese and blended equipment. 
Similar benefits derived from utilising Chinese and Indian equipment can be 
observed in agricultural mechanisation in Tanzania (Ageyi-Homles, 2014) and 
in Uganda’s apparel sector (Botchie, 2014). 
 
Organisational upgrading 
 
In many cases, particularly in informal sector clusters, there may be more 
scope for upgrading, and with lower barriers to entry with disembodied 
organisational technologies than from the introduction or adaptation of 
embodied technologies. This may involve workflow, quality procedures, 
storage of materials, maintenance of machines and business strategy. These 
“soft” elements of process technology are often reduced to the development 
of Business Plans and the provision of finance by governments and NGOs. 
But whilst these are important issues, they meet only a restricted part of the 
organisational technology upgrading agenda. It is notable that in each of the 
East African clusters using Chinese and Indian equipment described above, 
there is no evidence of structured attempts to facilitate cluster upgrading by 
addressing skill development, machine maintenance and repair and workflow. 
Each of these arenas were the sole responsibility of the individual 
entrepreneurs and in most cases, there has been very little change in any of 
these clusters. 
 
The Inter-firm division of labour and functional upgrading 
 
As Adam Smith observed, one of the major drivers of productivity growth is 
specialisation within firms and in the division of labour between firms. This is 
often a natural outcome of cluster dynamics, as Schmitz documented in the 
Sinos Valley footwear industrial district in Brazil (Schmitz 1995b). An increase 
in the inter-firm division of labour poses multiple upgrading challenges for 
clusters. It reflects a drive towards the specialisation of components 
manufacture and their disassociation from assembly. But increasingly it also 
involves the development of specialised business services providers, for 
example, in the extension of standards in value chains and in the provision of 
support with regard to finance and marketing.   
 
Once enterprises begin to participate in governed value chains, they also then 
need to engage with the challenge of functional upgrading. That is, an 
upgrading strategy may involve the capacity to change position in the chain, 
perhaps moving from low-skilled assembly to more skill-intensive component 
manufacturing, or beginning to design, brand and market products 
independently. The drive towards functional upgrading may only have broader 
economic benefits if the cluster as a whole changes its position in the value 
chain. If individual firms merely swop their position in the chain, they may gain 
                                             
8  The idea of “technological blending” was introduced by Bhalla in 1975 to describe the 
blending of traditional and modern technologies (Bhalla, 1975) 
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or lose as separate economic agents, but there may be little upgrading in the 
chain as a whole. 
 
 
4. UPGRADING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
The Rise of GVCs 
 
As we will see below, the driving force in the post 1970s deepening of 
globalisation was the extension of global value chains (GVCs). In its simplest 
form, the VC is a descriptive term, referring to a series of sequential activities 
which transform inputs, through various stages (links), into final outputs 
(Porter, 1985 and 1990). In this sense, the VC lacks analytical content. Its 
value lies in its being an heuristic tool which provides a synoptic overview of 
the activities involved in a chain of production. However the VC theoretical 
framework provides an analytical skeleton to this descriptive flesh. The central 
insight into this analytical framework was provided by Gereffi in 1994 (Gereffi 
et al., 1994). He observed that the increasing fragmentation of VCs required 
coordination, and that this coordination involved power relations, which he 
referred to as “governance”. He also observed, as we will discuss below, that 
the increasing fragmentation of VCs was being played out on a global level, 
with the resultant trend toward the global dispersion of production. 
 
Underlying the extension of GVCs is the division of labour highlighted by 
Adam Smith as being the source of productivity growth. From the late 1960s, 
we can observe a development in corporate strategy in which firms 
specialised in their core competences. This meant that they focused their 
efforts on those activities which customers valued, which were relatively 
unique to the firm and which were difficult to copy (Hamel and Prahalad, 
2004). In other words, they sought to concentrate on their rents, and to 
develop the capabilities to develop dynamic rents when barriers to entry were 
eroded and when customer preferences changed. All other activities were 
outsourced. Initially much of this outsourcing was proximate to their core 
operations, but as global transport and communication channels improved 
and as capabilities became increasingly dispersed globally, outsourcing took 
the form of offshoring. It is this widespread trend towards offshoring by global 
buyers that led to the rapid export-led growth of the East Asian economies 
during and after the 1970s (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006). 
 
The global extension of these VCs resulted in a structural transformation of 
the global economy. The significance of this becomes apparent if we compare 
the late twentieth pattern of global integration with that of the late nineteenth 
century (bearing in mind that the trade-GDP ratios in both eras were 
comparable). The economic textbooks tell us that in perfect markets, trade 
occurs between unrelated parties in anonymous arms-length transactions. No 
one buyer or seller is sufficiently dominant such that their actions affect the 
price of these transactions. At the other extreme of these trade relations are 
vertically integrated firms, often operating on a global basis. Faced with the 
transaction costs involved in purchasing inputs, the danger that suppliers 
might gain insights into their core competences and erode their rents, and the 
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reluctance of some suppliers to invest in production processes for a single 
buyer, firms have often chosen to internalise rather than to outsource the links 
in the chain (Williamson, 1985). Somewhere in-between these arms-length 
and internalised structures to global trade lies a category of trading links 
which are not characterised by equity relations between firms in the chain, but 
involve “sticky” (that is repeated and trust-intensive) relations between trading 
partners. The GVC analytical framework addresses this category of non-
anonymous and trust-intensive trade relations, particularly involving parties 
with thin or no equity links. But it also includes intra-firm trade within 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Both of these sets of trading relations 
involve coordination and governance and thus hierarchies of power between 
the different parties in the trading value chain. 
 
In the late nineteenth century the bulk of international trade was in arms 
length transactions, although intra-firm trade was growing rapidly as large 
firms began to extend their operations, first within national borders (Chandler, 
1977) and subsequently across national borders (Wilkins, 1974). But after the 
1970s, as an increasing number of firms in an increasing number of sectors 
began to focus on their core competences and to offshore the sourcing of 
non-core competences, the category of governed, non-equity linked trade 
grew rapidly. Figuratively speaking, the structure of trade in these two eras of 
global integration (internationalisation and globalisation) looks like the picture 
depicted in Figure 1. On the vertical axis is the notional share of global trade; 
the horizontal axis depicts the degree of governance in these trade flows. 
 
Figure 1: The structure of global trade in the late 19th and late 20th centuries. 
 
 
 
 
 
We have an underdeveloped capacity to put accurate numbers to this notional 
picture depicted in Figure 1. Recognising the growing significance of GVCs in 
trade, the OECD and the WTO have homed in on the share of intermediates 
in global trade as an indicator of GVC trade. By 2012, more than half of total 
global merchandise exports and more than two-thirds of traded goods and 
services comprised intermediate products and services (OECD, 2012). The 
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World Trade Organisation estimates that 28% ($5tr out of $19tr) of global 
trade in 2010 involved double-counting, that is the value of intermediate 
products traded directly across national borders and indirectly and 
subsequently incorporated in final products (UNCTAD, 2013). This definition 
of GVC trade is not analytically equivalent to that implicit in the GVC analytical 
framework (since some of the trade in these intermediate products involves 
arms length-relations), but it serves as a useful proxy for the absolute and 
growing size of GVC trade in global trade (Sturgeon and Memedovic, 2010).  
 
 
Sectoral Differentiation: Two Families of GVCs 
 
It is customary to distinguish between two sets of VCs (Gereffi et al., 1994; 
Gereffi, 1999). The first are ‘buyer driven’ chains, in which the lead firm is at 
the forward end of the chain, either interfacing directly with final consumers 
(for example, Walmart), or commanding the brandnames which define 
competitiveness in final consumer markets (for example, Nike and Levi-
Strauss). By contrast, ‘producer driven’ chains are commanded by firms 
holding core technologies, such as General Electric in the power turbine 
sector, Intel in chip architecture, Ford and Toyota in the automotive sector, 
and Microsoft in personal computer software. These two types of chains are 
archetypes in the sense that in some sectors there are both buyer- and 
producer-driven chains,9 and within chains there are often components of 
buyer-driven sub-chains in producer-driven chains and vice versa.10  
 
Beyond this taxonomy of buyer- and producer-driven chains lies another 
distinction which has particularly important implications upgrading and 
sustainable growth. This is the contrast between chains which involve ‘vertical 
specialisation’ and those which are essentially ‘additive” in nature.  
 
Vertically specialised value chains  
 
Vertically specialised chains result from the fracturing of VCs as firms 
specialise increasingly in their core competences and outsource non-core 
activities. This leads to the fragmentation and slicing up of production into a 
myriad of sub-processes. These activities can be undertaken in parallel – that 
is, at the same time - and since there is little processing loss in production and 
no degradation of inputs, there is no intrinsic need for the various stages to be 
co-located. They thus lend themselves ideally to global dispersion. The well-
known example of the Apple iPhone4 illustrates this well (Xing and Detert, 
2010). Each device retailed at just under $500 in the US. The phones were 
exported from China - ‘made in China’ – at a unit price of $179. But the value 
added in China was only $6.50, with the balance made up of imported 
components (for example, valued at $80 from Korea, $25 from the US and 
                                             
9  For example, in the apparel sector, Nike outsources all production and operates as a 
buyer-driving governor, whereas Zara’s command over its chain arises from its 
competences in production and logistic organisation. 
10  For example, whereas Walmart and Tesco exert meta-governance in their fruit and 
vegetable GVCs, there is also a degree of countervailing producer-driven power by 
the firms governing logistics in these sectors. 
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$16 from Germany), and service payments to Apple in the US.11 This reflects 
a production chain in which parts are sourced from all over the world, are 
assembled under Apple’s design in China and then branded and marketed in 
the US and other final markets (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The Apple iPhone4 GVC 
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) 
 
The more complex and extended the chain – that is, the greater the number of 
stages in value addition - the more likely it will be vertically specialised. In 
general this occurs in the manufacturing sector where final products are 
assembled using a variety of components (more than 3,000 in an automobile, 
and more than 15,000 in an aero engine). A reconfiguration of the way in 
which services are produced, also means that these too can comprise of a 
range of ‘assembled’ activities. For example, call-centres are part of a much 
larger fragmented chain of production, distribution and after-sales support. 
This fracturing and global dispersion of services is also increasingly 
evidenced in higher knowledge content activities in the legal, architectural and 
health sectors. 
 
Additive value chains  
 
Additive VCs involve a process of sequentially adding value to each stage of 
the chain and in this sense they contrast sharply with the structure of vertically 
specialised GVCs which involve in-parallel production of various stages of the 
products manufacture. Additive GVCs tend to characterise the resource 
sector where the primary input into the final conversion process makes up a 
large proportion of total value of the final product, where the primary input 
may be varied as a result of the specific characteristics of the resource, and 
where processing losses may form an important component of overall product 
value.  
 
A typical example of an additive chain is the production and processing of 
cocoa into chocolate (Figure 3). This involves a series of sequential stages, 
                                            
11  An important caveat needs to be made to this oft-cited example. This is that these 
numbers only reflect the first-round of disaggregation. However many of the inputs 
imported into China are themselves a product of vertically specialized sub-chains, so 
that the overall value added in China (and indeed in all the countries reflected in 
Figure 2) are likely to be rather different from those reported by Xing and Detert. 
Rather than undermining the analysis by Xing and Detert, this caveat reinforces their 
central observation of the fracturing of GVCs. 
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which unlike vertically specialised chains, are difficult to execute in parallel. 
Beyond the growing stage, there is greater scope for geographical fracturing 
of production, and there are a variety of outcomes in the post-growing and 
post-primary processing geographical division of labour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Cocoa Additive Value Chain 
 
 
 
In the cocoa sector Ghana and Cameroon provide two examples of 
contrasting forms of geographical fracturing, albeit within the confines of an 
additive and sequential value chain (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014b). In Ghana 
industrial policy was instrumental in building human resource capabilities and 
infrastructure, Global grinders responded to this by integrating backward, 
relocating processing facilities and buying activities within Ghana. This 
secured supplies and increased their flexibility to meet global chocolate 
manufacturers quality and price specifications in the context of an expectation 
of increasingly constrained global supply. In contrast, in Cameroon the lack of 
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public initiative has resulted in the export mainly of raw cocoa beans, with 
very thin domestic value added.12 
 
As in the case of the producer- buyer-driven taxonomy, there is no water-tight 
coincidence of sector and vertical specialisation/additive GVCs. Whilst GVCs 
in the manufacturing and services sectors are increasingly vertically 
specialised, there are exceptions to this general trend and some 
manufactured products are better suited to sequential value addition even in 
the same sector. For example, in the apparel, furniture and footwear sectors 
there are two distinct VC structures. Production for large volume standard 
products tends to be fractured and globally dispersed (that is, closer to the 
vertically specialised mode), whereas production for rapid-response, smaller 
volume and higher income market niches tends to occur in more vertically 
integrated chains closer to final consumer markets (that is, more like additive 
VCs). Similarly in the service sectors we can observe a mix of globally 
outsourced fractured chains (for example in call centres) and close-to-the 
market holistic chains (for example, financial services). 
 
Nonetheless, despite this heterogeneity of form in manufacturing and 
services, the resource sectors tend to be dominated by additive value chains 
for a number of reasons. The options for the fracturing of the chain are often 
more limited. Resource extraction is relatively immobile, that is, it is 
determined by a gift of nature, hence the oft-used phrase “fixed point 
commodities” to characterise this sector. Second, in the case of almost all 
natural resources there is extensive weight/volume loss in processing. Third, 
the quality of many agricultural commodities (such as sugar) degrades if they 
are not processed soon after harvesting. Fourth, when there are few rents in 
forward processing (in other words, many producers can compete against 
each other), lead firms often encourage value additive value chains in 
resource producing economies, for example in the manufacture of plywood 
and veneers. And, fifth, as we have observed, in the resource sector the 
‘product’ is built up in a series of sequential stages as the raw materials pass 
through various stages of processing. This is contrast to manufacturing and 
some services where many sub-processes can be undertaken in parallel.  
 
These differences are reflected in the structure of global trade. A joint enquiry 
between the World Trade Organisation and the OECD estimates that around 
75% of global trade occurs within GVCs, and that the vertically specialised 
chains are growing more rapidly than are the additive GVCs. However, from 
the perspective of low income economies, this balance between chain types 
takes a different form. In Africa’s cases, more than 75% of exports involved 
additive chains, a direct consequence of Africa’s specialisation in the resource 
sector  (OECD, 2014). 
 
 
Upgrading in GVCs 
 
                                             
12  For other examples of contrasting patterns of geographical dispersion in additive 
GVCs, see Kaplinsky and Morris 2014b and Morris and Fessehaie 2012. 
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The heterogeneity and spread of GVCs means that there is a complex 
upgrading agenda required to facilitate sustainable growth. Here we can 
distinguish three levels of action – economy-wide policies which have a 
derived impact on GVCs, policies specific to all GVCs and policies which are 
specific to each of the two families of GVCs. 
 
Economy-wide policies and their impact on upgrading in GVCs 
 
We begin briefly by considering the relevance of general policies designed to 
support upgrading in all sectors, serving both domestic and foreign markets. 
Here we are informed by a broad emerging consensus on industrial policy. 
This draws on the recognition that resource allocation is characterised by both 
market and policy failure. An exclusive focus on market failure provided the 
rationale for the dirigiste import substitution policies of the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s in the developing world. The focus on state failure accompanied the 
rolling out of the neo-liberal agenda in the 1980s and 1990s. Now, a more 
measured stance is emerging which gives renewed legitimacy to the role the 
state can play in supporting (as opposed to commanding or guiding) the 
development of capabilities in the productive sector (Rodrik, 2004; Chang, 
2014). The developmental challenge then revolves around the social and 
political conditions in which this alliance can be forged.  
 
Within this emerging consensus, there is broad-ranging agreement around a 
number of policy agendas, and specifically with regard to policies addressing 
market failures in public goods. Foremost amongst these is the issue of 
human resource development. Closely allied to this agenda is the 
development of institutions in the National Systems of Innovation (NSI), and in 
support for Research and Development. Also of foremost importance is the 
development of infrastructure, particularly information and communications 
technology, but also physical infrastructure (such as the railways, ports and 
aerospace which are required to facilitate global trade).  
 
Other dimensions of generalised policies to support the dynamism of the 
productive sector are more controversial, but nevertheless widely-evidenced. 
Although there is a widespread and generalised commitment to an open 
trading environment, in reality many countries continue to craft their trade 
policies to support the particular needs of their productive sectors. Key 
sectors are often excluded from trade liberalisation (the US, for example, 
limits exports of hydrocarbons and prohibits foreign ownership in the airline 
sector) and bilateral trade deals proliferate. There is also a difference in the 
approach adopted towards factor mobility and ownership. In general, capital is 
more mobile than labour, but some countries are more open to labour mobility 
than others, and many countries continue to pursue ownership-specific 
policies which favour domestically owned firms. Finally, the complexity of 
technological progress is growing rapidly such that no economy can hope to 
compete across the range of sectors and thus virtually all economies provide 
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incentives to promote the growth of particular sectors.13 However, the degree 
of commitment to sectoral targeting varies widely across countries. 
 
 
Policies supporting a rent agenda across GVCs in general 
 
 
The GVC analytical framework identifies four categories of upgrading – 
process, product, functional and chain upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2000). The mechanisms which determine the pattern of upgrading and the 
distribution of chain rents are widely addressed in the GVC literature (see the 
plethora of material available at http://www.globalvaluechains.org; 
http://www.capturingthegains.org; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Space 
constraints limit us from fleshing out these mechanisms, which include: 
 
 Chain governance (Gereffi et  al., 1994, 1999 and Gereffi et al., 2005): 
Chain governors determine the division of labour in the chain, and this 
defines the capacity of individual firms to generate and appropriate 
rents. For example, IKEA limits the capacity of its furniture suppliers to 
develop and (especially) to brand their product offerings (Kaplinsky, 
Morris and Readman, 2002). It confines its suppliers to process 
improvement and systematically searches for alternative suppliers in 
order to ensure a competitive supplier environment and low cost 
supplies. On the other hand it protects its high rents by commanding its 
brand name and retailing exclusivity. Thus a key objective in GVC 
upgrading is for firms to enter into chains which provide the scope for 
upgrading their operations and to move out of links which have very 
low barriers to entry.14 
 
 Market Insertion: Different markets have different requirements and 
provide the scope for different margins (Staritz and Morris 2014). They 
are increasingly segmented and volatile, especially in high-income 
markets. Although markets in low and middle-income economies are 
beginning to experience similar patterns of segmentation and volatility, 
in general they tend to be more price sensitive, less quality sensitive 
and involve a smaller role played by civil society in defining market 
preferences such as organic, labour and environmental standards 
(Kaplinsky, Terheggen and Tijaja, 2011). Moreover, command over 
brand names is an important determinant of rent distribution, and helps 
to explain the pattern of functional integration whereby formerly lead 
                                             
13  Strategic support for the military sector is clearly evident across many economies and 
this has spawned a number of technologies of commercial importance (including the 
internet) (Mazzucato, 2013). Other examples of sectoral incentives are the UK 
support for the automotive sector, the US for the hydrocarbon and processing sectors 
and Germany for renewable energy.  
14  For example, selling furniture into smaller retail outlets offers greater scope for 
producers to design and brand their own products, although with much smaller 
volumes than those involved in serving IKEA and other global multiples (Kaplinsky, 
Morris and Readman, 2002). 
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manufacturing firms have vacated production and subcontracted this to 
low and middle income economies. 
 
 The importance of standards: Different final markets and different 
GVCs impose different standards on producers (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005; Kaplinsky, 2010). Some of these standards are set by 
governments (for example, phytosanitary standards), some are set of 
lead firms in their GVCs (for example, Toyota imposes standards 
affecting quality, delivery and cost on its tiers of chain suppliers) and 
others are set  by civil society (for example, labour standards). These 
standards have implications for who is included in GVCs (often smaller 
producers find it difficult to meet these standards), but they play an 
important role in the upgrading challenge since many standards 
institute processes which help to endogenise and strengthen innovative 
capabilities amongst producers. 
 
 Power Asymmetry: Many GVCs are characterised by the increasing 
concentration of buyers (Gereffi, 2014), sometimes involving final retail 
chains and in other cases intermediary firms such as Li and Fung in the 
apparel sector and Foxconn in the consumer electronics sector. In 
general, there is much less concentration amongst producers 
(particularly many agricultural GVCs) even though the requirements for 
participating in GVCs tends to exclude the very smallest producers 
(http://www.capturingthegains.org). This power asymmetry affects the 
division of labour in GVCs and the capacity of different producers to 
upgrade their offerings. 
 
 Ownership and Embeddedness: Different patterns of ownership affect 
the pattern of supply chain upgrading and hence upgrading trajectories 
in the GVC. The prime movers of supply chain upgrading were the 
Japanese auto firms in the 1970s and 1980s (Cusumano, 1985), These 
procedures were subsequently widely copied by many US and 
European firms, but less so by TNCs originating in the developing 
world such as those originating in China (Fessehaie and Morris, 2013) 
who are less adept at assisting their suppliers to upgrade. But not all 
differences are associated with the nationality of ownership, and in 
some environments, different types of ‘foreign’ owners may be 
differentially embedded in the local economy, as is the case in the 
apparel industry in Madagascar (Morris and Staritz, 2014). 
 
These “building blocks” of chain upgrading are evidenced to varying degrees 
and in varying ways across the spectrum of GVCs and each can be 
strengthened or weakened by policy intervention. They comprise a generic set 
of GVC-upgrading issues and are not affected by either the buyer-/producer 
drivenness of GVCs, or whether they are vertically specialised or additive 
GVCs. 
 
 
Policies specific to each of the two families of GVCs 
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Beyond policies which are generic to the productive sector in general and to 
all GVCs are those policies required to respond to the different demands of 
the two families of GVCs identified earlier, namely vertically specialised and 
additive GVCs.  
 
“Thinning” in vertically specialised GVCs 
 
Traditional industrial policy has been focused on the building of value added 
in strategically chosen sectors. In many respects, most notably perhaps in the 
example of Ford’s River Rouge integrated automobile plant in the late 
1920s 15 , a similar mentality can be observed within the private sector. 
However, the development of strategic corporate agendas designed to 
specialise in core competences (involving the outsourcing of much of the 
products value added) went against the grain of these value-deepening 
policies. Firms reduced their share of product value added, and since much of 
this outsourcing was offshored, so did many economies, importing many of 
the intermediates used in production. Thus, by the end of the first decade of 
the twenty first century, a survey of the largest US manufacturing firms found 
that they simultaneously accounted for 89.2% of all exports and 88.1% of all 
imports (US Census Bureau, 2013). That is, their operations were deeply 
embedded in GVCs in which much of the intermediate components in 
production were sourced form abroad. 
 
We characterise this policy of outsourcing in GVCs as one of “thinning out” 
and contrast this with the building up of value added which has historically 
characterised industrial policy (Figure 4). In this environment firms and 
economies specialise less in sectors and products than in capabilities. The 
value they add through their activities may comprise only a small fraction of 
the product’s final production cost, and an even smaller component of its final 
price given the growing importance of branding and marketing in many 
sectors. However, the process of thinning (defined as a share of total product 
value added) may involve a transition form low value added to high value 
added activities in the chain. Having initially “thinned” their contribution, the 
firm may over time seek to rebuild its share of value added in a sector, but 
seldom seek to emulate the value adding ambitions of the traditional import 
substituting policy agenda. 
 
                                             
15 In Henry Ford’s mass production River Rouge plant constructed in 1927, virtually the whole 
value of the car was added in a single plant from the unloading of iron ore, through the 
manufacture of steel and the manufacture and assembly of the components into the final 
vehicle. 
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Figure 4: “Thinning” out in vertically specialised GVCs16 
 
 
  
 
From the perspective of the firm to which the  activities were outsourced, this 
may involve two contrasting strategies. For those firms who are newly 
incorporated into the chain or who are new entrants into the sector, the 
strategy is one of “thinning in”. That is, they enter the chain by contributing a 
low proportion of product value added. An example of this are the firms which 
are newly established to assemble apparel on a cut-make-and-trim basis. On 
the other hand there are supplier firms who have long operated in the sector 
and for whom chain entry involves a  “thinning out” of activities, reducing the 
range of activities which they have historically undertaken. Keeping the 
apparel sector as an example, this would represent the experience of a firm 
which gives up its own design and brandnames to assemble apparel for an 
outsourcing lead buyer. 
 
Given that much of the outsourcing of non-core competences was offshored, 
the policies which specifically address the promotion of vertically specialised 
GVCs, particularly in the short run, relate primarily to trade policy. The 
objective here is to reduce the impediments to international trade, such as 
removing quotas and tariffs on imports, introducing incentives to promote 
exports and removing “at the border” bureaucracy and obstacles which hinder 
trade. Complementing this trade policy is the creation and smooth functioning 
of trade infrastructure such as ports and airports and the introduction of 
effective access to the internet. In economies where entry into export markets 
is provided by foreign lead firms, the vertically specialised GVC policy agenda 
also generally targets the development of Export Processing Zones (referred 
to as Special Economic Zones in China). These EPZs provide inducements to 
                                            
16  The structure of this Figure was suggested by Will Milberg. 
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foreign investors such as freedom from the taxes and labour legislation which 
are required in production for the domestic market and the provision of 
subsidised accommodation. In some cases, the policy framework supporting 
vertically specialised GVCs involves policies introduced in other economies. 
Trade Agreements such as the African Growth and Employment Act (AGOA) 
and the Caribbean Trading Initiative (providing preferential market access into 
the USA) were in part specifically designed to foster the expansion of 
vertically specialised GVCs in exporting economies. 
 
Beyond the trade policies promoting the early development of these vertically 
specialised GVCs are follow-on policies designed to deepen presence in rent-
rich links in the chain. Primarily executed at the firm-level, this often follows an 
upgrading trajectory reflecting the four categories of upgrading identified in the 
GVC theoretical framework, namely process upgrading, product upgrading, 
functional upgrading and chain upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). 
This upgrading trajectory is widely evidenced in the Asian economies which 
have successfully pursued a vertically specialised GVC path (Figure 5). The 
firm enters the GVC by merely assembling to the designs of the lead firm (for 
example, the iPhone 4 in China). Its upgrading trajectory in this early stage is 
one of process improvement. Initially it may concentrate on improving its 
efficiency and subsequently, as capabilities increase, the firm may move from 
assembly to manufacturing (that is, the transforming of materials) and 
incorporating a greater degree of self-produced or locally-sourced 
components.17 As capabilities deepen the firm may shift to product upgrading, 
developing the capacity to design its own products (for example, laptop 
computers in Taiwan and China sold under the brand names of global firms). 
After a while, the firm may engage in functional upgrading, building its own 
brand-presence, either in its own right (Samsung) or by acquiring the brand 
name of a recognised firm (Lenovo purchasing IBM computers and marketing 
the Thinkpad). Finally, once chain capabilities are mastered by competitors 
the firm may move to a new chain.  
 
An underlying trend along this trajectory is one of growing knowledge-intensity 
and an increase in the share of disembodied activities. As this trajectory 
develops firms often move their position in the chain such that they may 
themselves outsource non-core assembling and then manufacturing 
competences to other producers as they transition into new links in the chain. 
This dynamic was observed for example in Taiwan apparel manufacture 
outsourcing to China, and now is beginning to be observed in coastal Chinese 
firms who, as wages rise, outsource their labour-intensive activities to firms in 
the interior or into neighbouring economies such as Vietnam. 
 
 
                                             
17   For example, between 2011 and 2013, the number of firms supplying batteries for the 
iPhone in China doubled from 8 to 16, and local firms began to produce formerly 
imported inputs such as acoustic components (Mishkin, 2013). Although 
undocumented, the value added in China in the production of the iPhone5 almost 
certainly is much greater than the $6.50 incorporated in the early versions of the 
iPhone4. 
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Figure 5: An upgrading trajectory in vertically specialised GVCs 
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This upgrading trajectory, enacted at a firm-level, is often significantly 
enhanced by government support (at a firm, cluster, or sector level). The 
support includes the strengthening of the National Systems of Innovation 
relevant to the sector, human resource development and financial incentives 
to promote R&D and innovation.  
 
“Thickening” in additive GVCs 
 
In additive GVCs the strategic focus is on “thickening” by building linkages in 
order to deepen value added in the sector. This is predominantly the case in 
the resource sector, although as observed above, it also applies to some 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
Within the resource sector there have been two contrasting approaches 
towards linkage development. The dominant view for some time built on the 
analysis provided by Singer (Singer, 1950). Singer argued that lead firms in 
the resource sectors had little interest in promoting linkages. This was 
because local capabilities in many low and middle income economies were 
weak, because the technological capabilities required to produce inputs into 
the mining sector were fundamentally different from those involved in mining 
itself, and because the lead firms were operating in an era of internalisation 
and had little interest in outsourcing any of their activities. Singer referred to 
this as “enclave development” and although he was referring to the mining 
sector, his analysis was applicable to the oil and gas sector as well. 
 
Hirschman offered a different approach. He saw industrial development and 
structural change as arising from the development of linkages. In his phrase, 
industrial development and structural change occurred as a natural process -  
“One thing leads to another” (Hirschman, 1981). He identified three sets of 
linkages from the resource sector. The first were fiscal linkages, in which 
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resource rents were captured by the state and were used to promote 
diversification in sectors unrelated to the resource sector. The second type of 
linkages were consumption linkages, with industrial development being 
spurred by demand created by incomes generated in the resource sector. His 
third and final set of linkages were production linkages, backward into 
upstream supplying industries, and forwards into downstream processing 
sectors. We might add to Hirschman’s production linkages a third sub-
category, namely horizontal linkages, in which capabilities built in serving the 
needs of the resource sector find subsequent application in linking to other 
sectors. 
 
Hirschman’s approach was a minority view and had little policy traction except 
for fiscal linkages where there have been wide-ranging attempts in many 
countries to promote structural change by taxing resource rents and using 
these to promote other sectors, often following a template of sectoral targeting 
designed to replicate the prior experience of more industrially advanced 
economies (Syrquin and Chenery, 1989; Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2010; Lin 
and Monga, 2010). Policy instruments designed to achieve these ends include 
- but are not limited to – some measure of import protection to protect new 
domestic industries, sectoral targeting accompanied by directed investment 
(including by state owned enterprises), offset-agreements (where foreign-
owned resource extracting firms gain access to scarce commodities in return 
for investing in industrial sectors, including in production linkages with the 
resource sector). Consumption linkages have had little traction since in the 
context of pervasive import liberalisation, much of the consumer demand 
generated in the resource sector was met through imports. 
 
It is in Hirschman’s category of production linkages that there has been a 
reappraisal of the conventional wisdom surrounding enclave development. In 
part this is because contrary to Singer’s dismissal of the history of linkage 
development, there is in fact considerable evidence that linkages from the 
resource sector have played an important role in the industrial development of 
many now industrialised economies  (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). This 
includes the US and Canada in the nineteenth century, Norway and the UK in 
the twentieth century and now the USA in the fracking era of the early 21st 
Century. In fact, to the extent that Singer’s enclave theory was evidenced, it 
applied to low income economies which, at the time of his writing, possessed 
few technological capabilities and had virtually no local industry. This 
revisionism of the enclave thesis coincides with a reappraisal of the resource 
curse literature (Sachs and Warner, 2001). If a different measure of resource 
intensity is used, this over-turns the oft-cited result of the Sachs-Warner 
analysis that resource intensive economies have grown less rapidly than 
resource-poor economies (Lederman and Maloney, 2007).  
 
Recent studies which we have concluded on production linkages in Africa’s 
resource sector (Morris et al. 2012; Kaplinsky and Morris 2014) in fact found a 
considerable extent of “below the radar” linkage development, including in 
some rather surprising circumstances. To cite a few examples: The obvious 
and expected case of linkage development was in South Africa’s mining 
equipment and services sector (Kaplan 2012). This is the only sector in which 
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South Africa has a positive balance of trade and it is also a sector in which it 
plays a prominent role in global patenting. Less expected was the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector, where there is evidence of high-level knowledge intensive 
services backwards linkages, including those provided by local firms 
employing engineering and IT graduates (Adewuyi and Oyejide 2012). Ghana 
is emerging as a West African mining services hub, replicating the role long 
played by South Africa in the continent’s resource sector (Bloch and Owusu, 
2012). Botswana is developing its diamond trading, polishing and cutting 
industry (Mbayi, 2013).  
 
So, if the reality is a “below the radar” emergence of inter-sectoral linkages 
and intra-sectoral upgrading rather than an ossified enclave structure, what 
explains these developments? Here the VC framework provides important 
insights. First, as we have observed above, the dominant strand in corporate 
strategies has for some time been to outsource non-core activities. Hence the 
lead mining firms have an active interest in outsourcing, and if local suppliers 
and processors can serve their needs efficiently, this is the optimal outcome. 
This is a picture shown in Figure 6. On the vertical axis which reflects the 
build up of value added in the sector, a distinction is made between core-
competence and non-core competence value added activities. On the 
horizontal axis is the passing of time. What can be observed is that over time 
there has been a market driven process of linkage development, beginning 
with the “easy hits” of “low hanging fruit” and then slowing as the more difficult 
stages are confronted. This market driven process can either be speeded up 
or deepened into the core-competence rent-rich territory of the lead resource 
firm, or be slowed down by the policy environment. 
 
Figure 6: Market-led linkage development and the effect of policy 
 
 
Lead firms in GVCs are the key drivers in linkage development. As observed 
above, there are strong economic imperatives to outsourcing and supplier 
development. But they also face an attack on enclave activities from civil 
society organisations and governments seeking to promote deeper linkages in 
order to foster greater developmental spin-offs and better environmental 
outcomes from resource exploitation. Many of these lead firms have therefore 
adopted Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) supplier development 
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schemes in order to meet these demands from final customers. (The more 
progressive lead firms have increasingly begun to see CSR in a positive light 
as Corporate Business Development since this has the capacity to promote 
efficient local suppliers as well as to meet the needs of civil society). Related 
to this, demands for greener products in final markets have led to attempts to 
green supply chains, and since this requires attention to the whole value chain 
(with traceability a core component of green certification), this forces the lead 
firms into promoting capabilities along their whole supply chain, involving tiers 
of indirect suppliers as well as direct suppliers. 
Research into linkage development in Africa’s resource sector shows that 
these elements of GVC operations are naturally forcing through a process of 
linkage development in the resource sector, not just with regard to backward 
but also to forward and horizontal linkages (Morris et al., 2012; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2014). However it also shows that there are specific policies and 
strategic interventions, sometimes in partnership with international agencies 
or lead firms, adopted towards the linkage sector which promote a greater 
depth of value added. These include local content policies (Nigeria and 
Angola), building infrastructure specifically to meet the needs of the resource 
sector (Botswana diamond sector), marketing institutions to support domestic 
processing (cocoa sector in Ghana), export taxes to force local value addition 
(leather in Ethiopia), building industrial zones to facilitate linkages between 
lead firms and local manufacturers (copper suppliers in Zambia and leather 
tanning and footwear manufacturers in Ethiopia), restructuring government 
agencies with the support of the EU to upgrade local certification to meet 
EureGap standards (Nile perch fish in Uganda) and introducing human 
resource programmes to meet the specific needs of the resource sector 
(Angola and Nigeria).  
But the policy environment does not always have a positive impact on linkage 
development, and in some cases (notably Tanzania – Mjimba, 2013) can slow 
the process down or even reverse earlier gains (South Africa – Kaplan, 2012; 
Gabon – Terheggen, 2011). The point, however, is that all of these and 
related cases in other countries illustrate that there is a viable path to linkage 
development and GVC thickening. This can be aided by a series of traditional 
industrial policies instruments (for example, investments in general 
educational systems) complimented by VC specific policies such as local 
content programmes.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Drawing the threads of earlier discussion together, two important issues 
emerge. First, whilst it is clear that upgrading is critical for both sustained and 
sustainable growth, upgrading trajectories are complex and they vary across 
types of clusters and families of GVCs, what are the challenges involved in 
fostering more inclusive patterns of upgrading? Second, under what 
circumstances, if any, might it be possible to follow these complex upgrading 
(and inclusive upgrading) agendas simultaneously? The discussion which 
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follows is suggestive rather than well-worked, only seeking to identify the 
central elements of the analysis. 
 
 
Promoting More Inclusive Patterns of Upgrading 
 
Inclusive upgrading in clusters 
 
Two types of clusters have been identified. The first are those which 
predominate in most economies. These are clusters which have emerged 
spontaneously as a result of agglomeration economies. In more advanced 
cases these clusters are characterised by various elements of collective 
efficiency and serve increasingly distant markets, be they in the domestic or 
the global economy. 
 
In low and middle income economies, and particularly in the lower income 
group, many of these clusters are located in the informal sector, and those 
which are not, often had their roots in the informal sector. They also 
predominantly  tend to serve low income markets. In both these senses they 
contribute directly to the promotion of an inclusive industrialisation growth 
path.  
 
More problematic is the extent to which the upgrading trajectories in these 
clusters involve participation by the poor in the innovation process itself. Here 
there is no ‘natural’ outcome which takes the form ‘cluster development 
automatically serves to promote inclusive upgrading’. This is not to say that 
there are no upgrading dynamics which are endogenous to these clusters, but 
rather than the participation of poor producers in the upgrading process is 
contingent on circumstances, including the nature and extent of support 
provided to upgrading in the clusters. 
 
Even more problematic is the extent to which the upgrading in these clusters 
provides for environmentally and socially sustainable trajectories. In most 
cases the environmental footprint of these informal sector clusters is more 
adverse than production in formal-sector and non-clustered formal sector 
enterprises. Energy efficiency is characteristically low in these clusters, 
working conditions are poor (sometimes involving child labour), and effluents 
tend to be uncontrolled and sometimes hazardous. Therefore, in this sense 
these clusters may work against greater inclusion unless concrete steps are 
made to limit these adverse outcomes 
 
As we have seen, there are also clusters in low and middle income which 
have been ‘created’ through public initiatives or result from the efforts of lead 
firms. These are beginning to emerge in Africa as a result of Chinese bilateral 
aid (modelled on China’s experience with Special Economic Zones) and 
through investments by larger Chinese lead firms who seek to bring their 
suppliers with them. Although this is as yet an embryonic phenomenon, the 
evidence so far is that these ‘top-down’ clusters do little to promote inclusivity 
in terms of local ownership. In most of the zones which have emerged, the 
enterprises in the zones are Chinese-owned (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014b). 
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The degree of imported inputs is also high. Nothing is known of the upgrading 
performance or potential of these Chinese-origin clusters, at least in the 
African case.  
 
Inclusive upgrading in GVCs 
 
As observed above, we can distinguish two families of GVCs – vertically 
specialised GVCs, predominantly operating in the manufacturing and services 
sectors, and additive GVCs, predominantly operating in the resource sector. 
  
Beginning with the vertically specialised GVCs, there is considerable scope 
for inclusion of the poor in the form of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in 
GVCs. Indeed this has been one of the major factors driving income growth in 
China and other East Asian economies in recent decades. This is an 
organisational innovation story, arising from the fracturing and global 
dispersion of production chains. However, as was seen in the case of the 
Dominican Republic EPZs in the 1990s (Section 2 above), unless the links in 
the chain which are located in low and middle income economies are 
incorporated in an upgrading path (in process or product, and perhaps in 
function), the sustainability of the inclusion in these chains will be eroded as 
competitive plants are established elsewhere. In most of these vertically 
specialised GVCs output is destined for (predominantly higher income) 
consumers abroad, but there is no intrinsic reason why there may not be 
product innovation when output in some of these chains is targeted at lower 
Further, with regard to inclusive process innovation, recent experience 
suggests that competitive ‘lean production’ systems work best when they are 
involve kaizen (continuous-improvement) labour processes and this is one 
way in which the poor might be included in vertically specialised GVCs. In 
terms of environmental and social inclusion, there is a strong trajectory of 
upgrading in those GVCs where production feeds into final markets in the 
north, as consumers and global buyers demand increasingly stringent 
environmental and labour standards. By contrast, when the final market 
switches to lower income consumers in the south, there is some evidence of 
downgrading, with adverse social and environmental outcomes for the poor. 
 
 
 
The inclusive upgrading agenda in additive GVCs reflects in some respects 
the situation in vertically specialised GVC. Many of these additive chains are 
similarly governed by lead firms based in the north, and these lead firms place 
similar demands on their southern subsidiaries with regard to continuous 
improvement and social and environmental standards. However, additive 
GVCs tend to have much deeper value added operations in resource 
producing economies, and tend to involve a much higher degree of production 
by indigenously owned firms. These indigenous suppliers in many cases are 
less innovative than their northern counterparts, and whilst they may promote 
inclusion of unskilled labour and smaller scale suppliers in their chains, they 
may often be less likely to upgrade their production processes and to upgrade 
their environmental and social footprints. Inclusive upgrading in these sectors 
may thus be largely limited to the increasing incorporation of small scale and 
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indigenous firms and unskilled labour unless the state makes deliberate 
efforts to promote greater inclusion in upgrading trajectories.18 
 
 
Walking on More than One Leg 
 
Under what circumstances might it be possible to simultaneously promote 
inclusive industrialisation (with a particular focus on inclusive upgrading) in 
each of the three categories production (clusters and vertically specialised 
and additive GVCs) simultaneously? 
 
There is little conflict between the simultaneous development of cluster-based 
and GVC-based upgrading paths. They speak to broadly different productive 
communities and require broadly different forms of support so that there is 
little chance of a conflict of interests. Moreover, a common theme in each of 
these spheres is that of supply chain development and there may in some 
circumstances be considerable overlap between policies designed to aid 
upgrading in clusters and those seeking to promote more robust and 
innovative supply chains.  
 
However, the actors driving these two upgrading trajectories will differ. In the 
case of clusters - particularly in the early stages of informal sector dominated 
clusters - the key drivers are likely to be in the public and NGO sector. By 
contrast, in the case of GVCs it is likely to be the lead firms who play the 
primary role, although there is of course considerable scope for the state to 
assist in supply chain development, and for NGOs to promote environmental 
and social sustainability upgrading paths. 
 
There is more difficulty in simultaneously promoting upgrading in the two 
families of GVCs. Insertion into vertically specialised GVCs begins with a 
thinning of value added, with some subsequent thickening, whereas in 
additive GVCs the requirement is predominantly one of a thickening strategic 
agenda. Although both strategic agendas ultimately involve upgrading and the 
deepening of linkages and may appear to be similar in nature, their starting 
points (thinning and thickening) are fundamentally different, as are their final 
outcomes. The potential for conflict surfaces most sharply in relation to the 
trade regime underpinning growth and upgrading. In vertically specialised 
GVCs the emphasis is on what may be termed a “Washington Consensus” 
trade regime of open borders and trade facilitation, backed by a less-
Washington-Consensus-friendly innovation and industrial policy which 
supports the development of inputs such as skill development, infrastructure 
and Research and Development which are prone to market failure. The 
provision of these complementary inputs is undertaken in a manner which 
makes them available to the GVCs without mandating their use.  
 
By contrast, upgrading in additive GVCs is supported by a different trade 
regime. It is one which may limit imports of certain inputs where local 
                                             
18  The policies required to support inclusive innovation are discussed in various 
contribution in Dutz et al., 2014 
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provision is favoured, where local content may be a requirement of operation 
and where (as is currently the case in Indonesia) raw materials cannot be 
exported in unprocessed form. Thus, there may be a greater degree of 
compulsion and the use of financial sanctions with regard to the use of local 
inputs than in the case of vertically specialised GVCs. 
 
Consequently, whereas the policy agenda adopted to promote upgrading in 
additive GVCs may look more like those adopted in previous eras of import 
substituting industrialisation, the policy agenda for vertically specialised GVCs 
is closer to the textbook version of export oriented growth. We use the phrase 
“closer to” since despite the liberalisation of the trade regime required to 
facilitate these GVCs, the upgrading agenda requires the adoption of many of 
the policy tools involved in the promotion of additive GVCs, notably with some 
degree of sectoral targeting, in the promotion of skills and the National 
System of Innovation and in the provision of infrastructure. 
 
The extent of conflict and trade-off between these three upgrading arenas will 
be a function of country size and capabilities. Clearly, the larger the economy, 
the easier it is to walk on these diverse policy legs simultaneously. This has 
indeed been the case in China. There the Special Economic Zones which 
have dominated the export sector in the past and which are geared to 
facilitate trade have been insulated from policies directed towards deepening 
value added in industries predominantly serving the domestic market (Poon, 
2014). However, in smaller economies, and economies where export volumes 
are not large enough to allow for the recoupment on investment, there have 
been attempts to allow production in the Export Processing Zones to serve 
both domestic markets (where duties and taxes are paid) as well as (duty and 
tax free) export markets. This can pose insuperable problems of governance 
and is often an incentive to corruption and other forms of malfeasance as was 
the case in the Dominican Republic in the early 1990s (Kaplinsky, 1993).  
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